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IT'S THE HARD LUCK LIFE: WOMEN'S MORAL




Deciding the custody of a child, especially when that determination is
between separated parents, is one of the most contentious, emotional,
economic, and legal issues facing parents. Such allocations of child custody
between parents sometimes present special burdens for women. 1 This is
partially because children create specific fields of power relations between
parents or surrogate parents. 2 These power relations give rise to subsequent
power claims that are linked to the question of gender.3 Hence, the nature
of power claims available to women-as-mothers are sometimes quite
different from the power claims available to men-as-fathers. 4
Moreover, it has been argued that even with the growing normativity of
shared parenting between men and women and the expansion of father-only
parenting, maternal caring has remained a central feature of many modern
child custody arrangements.5 Hence, the potential for shared and father-
. Lolita Buckner Inniss is the Joseph C. Hostetler-Baker and Hostetler Professor of Law at Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University and a PhD candidate at Osgoode Hall, York
University, A.B. Princeton University, J.D. University of California, Los Angeles, LLM Osgoode Hall
Law School York University. She blogs at Ain't I a Feminist Legal Scholar Too?
(http://innissfls.blogspot.com/). The author thanks Professor April Cherry and Professor Sheldon
Gelman for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
This observation, and much of the discussion that follows in this paper, proceeds on the
assumption that separating parents are a male-female couple. There are, of course, separated same-sex
parent couples that face many of the issues discussed here. Same-sex parent couples may also encounter
a host of other challenges in the judicial allocation of child custody, beginning with the difficulty of
raising such matters before courts. Some research has suggested that even openly gay and lesbian
couples may feel uncomfortable bringing child custody matters in courts, and either eschew courts in
lieu of private mediation or adjudication or keep their sexuality closeted before courts. See Todd
Brower, Multistable Figures: Sexual Orientation Visibility and Its Effects on the Experiences of Sexual
Minorities in the Courts, 27 PACE L. REv. 141, 173-74, 186-87 (2007).
2 See Carol Smart, Power and the Politics of Child Custody, in CHILD CUSTODY AND THE POLITICS
OF GENDER 1, 2 (Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuijsen eds., 1989).
3id.
' Id.
* Id at 22.
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only parenting has sometimes been framed as a means of addressing
deficits in maternal caring.6 This particular discursive framing has
sometimes resulted in greater male control not only over children's lives,
but also over mothers' lives.7 In some cases, judicial rhetoric that addresses
father-only or father-primary custody has even appropriated tropes of
mothering and procreation to a masculine ethos. Such rhetoric has, as one
scholar has written in another context, allowed fathers to become "wives
unto themselves." 8 This type of judicial rhetoric is also, at times, a site for
the crafting of new familial regulatory mechanisms with which to manage
the changing social geography of motherhood.
It has been argued that there is a certain taken-for-grantedness about the
power claims of men and women in the context of child custody, and that
this power often exists unacknowledged in parenting relationships until a
conflict arises. 9 Additionally, there is a structuring to this power that is first
deployed in the private sphere of the home, but is also more largely
imbricated in structures outside of the home, especially in the state, and
most particularly, in legal settings. The law has numerous mechanisms for
deploying power. Noteworthy among them is the legal discursive
construction of the conflict itself and of the parties to the conflict. In the
wielding of discursive power in the allocation of child custody, the "best
interests of the child" is, and has been for several decades, the ever-present
catchphrase over the last several decades in the United States.' 0
All too often, assessments of a child's "best interests" become
mechanisms for structuring and maintaining existing gender based power
relations.' Even though rules and norms that exist to protect children may
be well-intended or well-founded, it still must be acknowledged that norms
such as the best interests standard may cause as many difficulties as they
resolve. It has long been asserted that the best interests standard is
sometimes vague and variable, therefore offering little guidance for courts
or parties.12 Indeed, it has been argued that the best interests standard is
6 Id.
7 Id
See LAURA DOYLE, BORDERING ON THE BODY: THE RACIAL MATRIX OF MODERN FICTION AND
CULTURE 125 (1994). Doyle writes within the context of literary and cultural narratives about maternity
and specifically about the "race mother." See generally id.
"Taken for grantedness" describes formulations by which certain propositions are accepted as
broadly understood, agreed upon or shared, and thus generating no conflict or disagreement. Anne-
Marie Simon-Vandenbergen, Peter R.R. White & Karin Aijmer, Presupposition and 'Taking-for-
Granted' in Mass Communicated Political Argument: An Illustration from British, Flemish and
Swedish Political Colloquy, in POLITICAL DISCOURSE IN THE MEDIA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
31, 32 (Anita Fetzer & Gerda Eva Lauerbach eds., 2007).
'0 See Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century
America, 290 (1985).
" See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child
Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV 727, 727 (1988).
12 See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 978 (1978) ("Under the best interests principle the outcome in court
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purposefully vague, and that this vagueness allows a court to address the
specific needs of each family coming before it. 13 One response to such
claims has been the development of standards such as the American Law
Institute's "approximation principle" in which custody is based on an
approximation of parental behavior and especially parental caretaking prior
to the separation. 14 This standard, however, is subject to the same criticism
as the best interests standard, as it offers little more clarity.' 5
The best interests test, as well as the approximation principle and other
similar tests, all suffer from many of the same flaws. First, these standards,
even where they may be helpful in reshaping the norms of parenting, are all
too often premised on the competing concerns and merits of parents.' 6
Such standards may also rely on the valorization of parental attributes that
may mean little in the child's day-to-day experience or overall welfare.' 7
Next, these tests do little to resolve conflicts about the actual history of
parent-child relations and do not allow for the assessment of the possibility
of parental growth or change. Finally, standards such as the best interests
test rely upon claims of a prevailing neutrality in such matters. The notion
of claiming neutrality in such an arena is troubling where, by necessity,
there must be a "best" or "preferred" outcome for the child.18 Claims of
neutrality and procedural fairness in the context of child custody are often
premised upon the development of lists of specific factors that courts must
consider in making child custody allocations. Several jurisdictions have
included within the list of factors "the moral fitness" or "character" of the
parent, while other jurisdictions address the morality of the parent in other
similar terms.19 Such assessments of morality and character, especially in
the context of child custody, raise special problems for women.
will often be uncertain: each spouse may be able to make a plausible claim for custody, and it may be
impossible to predict how a court would decide a disputed case.").
" PHILIP M. STAHL, CONDUCTING CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS: FROM BASIC TO COMPLEX
ISSUES 34-35 (2011).
14 See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.08 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 2002]; see also ANDREW 1. SCHEPARD,
CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 167
(2004); STAHL, supra note 13, at 35.
is See, e.g., Robert J. Levy, Custody Law and the ALI's PRINCIPLES: A Little History, a Little Policy,
and Some Very Tentative Judgments, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 67, 67-70 (Robin Fretwell Wilson
ed., 2006).
16 For instance, some scholars have advocated for a model of child custody allocation that avoids a
"status-based definition of fatherhood" and acts instead to "reinforce and recast its prior fathers' rights
decisions to establish a definition grounded on relationship and care." Nancy E. Dowd, Fathers and the
Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing Fathers, 54 EMORY L.J. 1271, 1275 (2005). Such a
model would still, by necessity, pit parents against each other.
1 See SCHEPARD, supra note 14, at 167-68; JOHN T. PARDECK, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: POLICY AND
PRACTICE 24 (2d ed. 2006).
18 See generally Gerald Dworkin, Non-Neutral Principles, 71 J. PHIL. 491 (1974).
19 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF. L. REV.
615, 621-22 (1992).
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Particularly of concern under the rubric of morality is when courts
engage in redemptive morality discourses, that is, discussions about
conditions that allow women to be revealed as or to be constructed as
"good mothers." In some cases, especially those where women succeed in
obtaining custody of their children, there are what J.R.R. Tolkien termed
"eucatastrophic" endings.20 Tolkien coined the term "eucatastrophe" in his
discussion of fairy stories.21 It refers to a "good catastrophe," the sudden,
joyous turn of events at the end of a story that results in the protagonist's
well being. 22 While in its most basic terms eucatastrophe is the proverbial
"happy ending," it represents the opposite-it is a new beginning, not an
ending. 23 According to one scholar, achieving eucatastrophe involves
"recovery" and "restoration," which is a process of "defamiliarization of
the known world to better appreciate its qualities." 24 Sexually misbehaving
mothers arguably experience that process of defamiliarization when they
leave the bounds of good motherhood. Such mothers recover and are
restored when they attain redemption by recommitting themselves to "good
motherhood" and performing their roles according to prevailing social
norms.
In this paper, I discuss the legal discursive construction of child custody
allocation between separated parents and the role of child custody in
discursively constructing motherhood. In shaping this discussion I first
offer a brief history of the discourse surrounding the allocation of children
between separated parents in Anglo-American jurisprudence. I then
consider the "moral fitness" rubric in child custody adjudications,
especially as it concerns marital sexual misconduct. Next, I consider
whether moral fitness is a legitimate ground for assessing parental fitness,
given the existence of what some scholars have termed "moral luck"-the
notion that the ability to act according to prevailing moral standards may be
contingent on factors outside of the actor's control. Finally, I suggest that
assessments of women's moral fitness in child custody allocations may
sometimes have to do with whether the structuring of events in their lives
creates a eucatastophe: a moment where problems are vanquished and
protagonists can begin their quests anew. I offer as an example of the
deployment of the moral fitness standard the case of Burris v. Burris,25 and
consider how moral luck and eucatastrophe are seen via the discursive
frames that operate in that case.
20 See Christopher Garbowski, Eucatastrophe, in J.R.R. TOLKIEN ENCYCLOPEDIA: SCHOLARSHIP
AND CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 176, 177 (Michael D.C. Drout ed., 2007).




25 388 N.E.2d 811 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
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II. MOTHERING DRAMA, MOTHERING TRAUMA:
THE LEGAL DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF CHILD CUSTODY
ALLOCATION BETWEEN SEPARATED PARENTS
The allocation of child custody during parental separation provides
almost a textbook illustration of the potential for both the drama and the
trauma of mothering. In the dominant imagination, the very idea that a
mother would lose custody of her child bespeaks failure not only in the
mothering role, but also in the womanly role. This is true because women's
thoughts and personal codes have traditionally been said to be developed
within the domain of the family, where relationships and the needs of
others rather than self-interest are the crux of feminine identity formation. 26
The proliferation of the discourse of maternal caring has occurred even in
the face of widespread articulation of modem, purportedly gender-neutral
standards for the allocation of custody. As one scholar asserted:
In most contested child custody determinations, men are on one side and
women are on the other; yet, the cases are decided as if gender had nothing to
do with the law that governs them. The "best interests of the child" standard,
the one most commonly applied, is generally considered to be gender-neutral,
hence sex equal.27
These instances of both drama and trauma are frequently reflected in
courtroom discourses concerning child custody. Because of the power
inscribed in the judicial process, the allocation of child custody has become
a potent site for the reification of longstanding myths and ideologies about
the nature of maternal versus paternal care. These myths began in early
common law times and persist even in modern times, despite significant
changes in law and in discursive representations of law in the context of
child custody.
Under early English common law, mothers had little power or control
over their children.28 Fathers possessed absolute custodial rights over their
children, or at minimum, paramount rights to custody.29 Some scholars
have asserted that this stemmed from notions of the father's innate
biological superiority as a guardian.30 As one treatise described it, "the
26 Wendy Brown, Finding the Man in the State, in THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE STATE: A READER
187, 196 (Aradhana Sharma & Akhil Gupta eds., 2006).
27 CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 628 (2001).
28 DOROTHY A. MAYS, WOMEN IN EARLY AMERICA: STRUGGLE, SURVIVAL, AND FREEDOM IN A
NEW WORLD 70 (2004).
29 JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS: EMBRACING
HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND MASTER AND
SERVANT 337 (3d ed. 1882). See also JOAN PERKIN, WOMEN AND MARRIAGE IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 14-15 (1989).
30 See, e.g., I J.H. THOMAS, SYSTEMATIC ARRANGEMENT OF LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122 (1836).
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father hath the first title to guardianship by nature, the mother the
second." 31 This was premised largely upon a father's legal obligations for
his children. 32 As early United States law was based on English law,
fathers seeking custody of children in early United States courts were in
much the same position as fathers in English courts. 33 However, as one
scholar has noted, while the outcome of child custody claims between
mothers and fathers was often the same in England and the United States in
these earlier times, there was a distinction in the rationale given.34 English
law gave fathers custody because of their superior rights as parents,
whereas early United States courts often gave fathers custody because of
their superiority as guardians.35 The distinction in the rationales offered by
courts is noteworthy, as one rationale speaks to the father's inherent
entitlements or permissions of parenthood (superiority of rights) and the
other addresses his capacity as a parent (superiority as guardians). It is
instructive to briefly address the discursive nature of the claims being made
in each instance.
The English superiority of rights approach asserts that fathers had, by
nature, paramount rights over children. 36 Although this did not translate to
absolute power over children, as was the case under ancient Roman law,37
it meant that the father had, for example, the right of association and could
therefore retain personal custody of the child or send the child to live with
whomever he pleased. 38 The father's rights also extended to devising
custody and control of a child by will upon the father's death, even where
the mother was still alive and herself desired custody.39 In contrast, early
English law gave the mother almost no authority over her children.40
Rather, the mother was entitled to "reverence and respect" only.41
The superiority as guardians approach to giving father's rights to
children in early United States cases would seem to be a move in the
direction of considering the interests of children. This change in discourse
is striking, as it heralds a move from being to doing-a transition from the
centrality of parental status and ascribed parental rights in parental identity
31 Id.
32 Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody, 4 FUTURE CHILDREN 121, 121 (1994)
" See DEBRA FRIEDMAN, TOWARDS A STRUCTURE OF INDIFFERENCE: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF
MATERNAL CUSTODY 28-29 (1995).
- See id at 60.
SId.
36 THOMAS, supra note 30, at 122.
3 Ancient Roman law allowed fathers to put their own children to death. See I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *452 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1902).
This proviso was softened by subsequent Roman constitutions. See id
" MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1994).
' Id. at 3.
4o BLACKSTONE, supra note 37, at *453.
41 id
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formation to the centrality of parental appropriateness of action and
parental ability in the process of parental identity framing.42 The
superiority as guardians approach gradually changed to give both mothers'
and fathers' claims to custody of the children of divorce or separation as
the standard became the now iconic and seemingly ever-present "best
interests of the children" test.43
It may be argued that these child-centric norms, present everywhere
from schools to mental health treatises to courts, were and are mechanisms
to regulate women and to require them to subjugate their needs and desires
to those of children and families. Consider, for example, how the move
towards a child-centric discourse in matters of child welfare, including
custody allocation, has often meant that "nurturing," "sensitive" mothers
are expected to avoid stringently regulating the child and to yield in overt
battles of the will between the mother and the child.44 Some scholars argue
that this shift to a child-centered, best interests of the children standard that
allows for the possibility of maternal custody occurred chiefly because the
labor of children became less important to family economy in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries.45 Hence, granting one parent primary custody of
children was no longer deemed a financial loss to the noncustodial parent.46
Indeed, as child labor has become less common and more restricted, it is
increasingly the case that the primary custodial parent bears an added
financial burden, not a benefit.47 This shift to a child-centered standard is
also sometimes attributed to a parallel movement assigning children an
emotional value and romanticizing the role of the mother.48
In more modern cases, those occurring in the middle and even late 20th
century, the best interests of the child standard often translated into a
preference for the mother in custody matters involving small children or
female children. 49 The practical position of many courts, even those
ostensibly embracing norms of equality dictated by formal law, was to
allow the mother the prima facie right to custody.50 Some reasons for
favoring the mother in custody cases include traditional notions of the
42 See, e.g., John R. Silber, Being and Doing: A Study of Status Responsibility and Voluntary
Responsibility, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1967).
43 KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON & CHRISTOPHER T. NOBLET, CHILDHOOD DENIED: ENDING THE
NIGHTMARE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 86-87 (2009).
4 See, e.g., VALERIE WALKERDINE & HELEN LUCEY, DEMOCRACY IN THE KITCHEN: REGULATING
MOTHERS AND SOCIALIZING DAUGHTERS 23-24 (1989).
45 REARDON & NOBLET, supra note 43, at 87.
46 id
47 See generally ANNE L. ALSTOTr, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT
SOCIETY OWES PARENTS (2004).
48 REARDON & NOBLET, supra note 43, at 87.
49 REARDON & NOBLET, supra note 43, at 91.
5o One study of Louisiana judges found disagreement among judges on a number of issues in
allocations of child custody, but one issue on which almost all agreed was the preference for awarding
custody to mothers. Leighton E. Stamps et al., Judges' Beliefs Dealing with Child Custody Decisions, in
CHILD CUSTODY: LEGAL DECISIONS AND FAMILY OUTCOMES 3, 3-5 (Craig A. Everett ed., 1997).
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mother's role in caring for the child and assumptions that she is better fitted
to attend to the needs of children, especially young children and females. 51
Very recent practice has, however, seen a shift in judicial preference, as
most United States courts have explicitly disavowed what is known as the
"tender years doctrine." 52 This has meant a move towards a theoretically
more even-handed approach in assessing the parent to whom residential
custody should be assigned.53 This translates into an embrace of dual, often
overlapping standards for primary custody of children.54 The best interests
of the child and the relative fitness of the parents work in tandem to
determine allocation of child custody whether as between two parents or
between parents and other parties.55
There are, not surprisingly, a number of factors that may be considered
when assessing the relative fitness of the parents to have the custody of
their minor children. 56 Perhaps one of the most contentious factors is
whether or the extent to which the parent seeking custody has engaged in
immoral behavior.57 Morality is a fluid concept that has both descriptive
and normative dimensions. However, it is all too often wielded with great
normative force, and in this regard acts as what one scholar has called a
"non-neutral principle."58 Moreover, even assuming some general
agreement on the warrants of morality, questions may arise regarding the
" See id. at 4.
52 The "tender years doctrine" is a longstanding notion asserted by society and the courts that
women were the best caretakers for very young children, those said to be of "tender years." ROBERT E.
EMORY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION 73
(1994). This was chiefly based upon beliefs about women's innate capacities as nurturers and
caretakers. Id; see also Stamps et al., supra note 50, at 4; ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 7 (1992).
53 See Stamps et al., supra note 50, at 4. Despite such changes, the common perception remains that
women are more frequently the winners in custody proceedings, even when men are equal or more
involved caregivers. See Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced
Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 967-76 (2005). Data suggests both bias in favor of and bias
against fathers in custody awards. NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 141-42 (2000).
54 See Stamps et al., supra note 50, at 4-6.
5 Id.
56 Id. at 5-6.
" Id. at 6.
8 Dworkin, supra note 18. Dworkin describes non-neutral principles as those principles appealed to
under conditions where there are persons:
(1) who propose to act in ways that restrict the liberty of others or take more liberties than
others on the basis of moral and political beliefs; (2) who are then faced with the challenge
of inconsistency insofar as they are not prepared to let others act as they do; and (3) who
meet the challenge by providing a principle they are prepared to let anyone act on.
Id. at 492. Non-neutral principles are held up as norms but are themselves contested. An example given
by Dworkin is where the principle supported by the state is "censor false views." Id. at 492. See also
Alex Tuckness, Legislation and Non-neutral Principles: A Lockean Approach, 8 J. POL. PHIL. 363, 364.
This is a contested or non-neutral principle because "whether the view is actually false is precisely what
is in dispute between the two parties." Id. at 364. See also Dworkin, supra note 18, at 499-501.
Frequently principles that purport to justify state-enacted coercion are non-neutral in this way. Id.
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moral standing of an agent-the right of an agent to enact norms regarding
morality, and whether that right is contingent upon the extent to which the
challenged behavior is public or private. 59 In many instances "immorality"
is synonymous with deemed sexually inappropriate behavior, especially
female sexual behavior. 60 This has especially been the case in the context
of child custody.
Despite the fact that "moral fitness" is a factor to consider in many
custody matters, generally stated, moral lapses such as adultery must be
shown to have a present adverse effect on the child in order for the
misconduct to be relevant.61 An allegation of sexual impropriety is not an
independent factor automatically barring an award of custody to the parent
found guilty of marital misconduct. 62 Courts have held that the fact that one
parent committed marital misconduct which itself was a basis of a divorce
decree in favor of the other parent may, but does not necessarily, constitute
a reflection on the guilty parent's fitness to have the custody of the child. 63
However, it becomes clear in reviewing cases regarding the general
assessment of parental fitness in the face of allegations of sexual
impropriety that judges' morals and values may be a significant factor in
how facts are assessed.64
Indeed, for much of the history of family law in the United States,
judges wielded broad discretion in such matters, thereby establishing what
one scholar has called a "judicial patriarchy": the social defense of
masculinity and male norms via the courts and social welfare
mechanisms. 65 In such matters, judges became both the bulwarks and the
referees between the family and the state. 66 The effect of judicial patriarchy
59 Gerald J. Postema, Public Faces-Private Places: Liberalism and the Enforcement of Morality, in
MORALITY, HARM, AND THE LAw 76, 81-83 (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1994).
60 See Estelle B. Freedman, "Uncontrolled Desires ". The Response to the Sexual Psychopath, 1920-
1960, 74 J. AM. HIST. 83, 87 (1987).
6R Hartley v. Hartley, 355 S.E.2d 869, 872 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Davenport v. Davenport,
220 S.E.2d 228, 230 (S.C. 1975)).
62 See Stamps et al, supra note 50, at 7.
63 For a discussion of the relationship between sexual behavior and immorality in the context of
child custody, see MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION
86-87 (1997).
6 See, e.g., VanName v. VanName, 419 S.E.2d 373 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992). In VanName, a husband
committed adultery before the couple's divorce, and continued his illicit relationship after the couple's
divorce. Id. at 373. The husband admitted that he allowed the lover overnight visits but denied that the
visits were conducted while the children were visiting. Id. at 374. Nonetheless the appellate court
affirmed a denial of change of custody to the husband, who had sought custody because of the mother's
proposed move. Id. at 374-75. In affirming custody in the mother, the appellate court cited the father's
illicit involvement. Id. In contrast, in Ford v. Ford, 419 S.E.2d 415, 416 (Va. Ct. App. 1992), the
appellate court affirmed an award of joint custody to the husband and the wife in circumstances where
the husband spent nights with his lover in the presence of the children. The court found that the children
had formed a "nonthreatening, platonic relationship" with the lover and hence there was no harm in
continuing joint custody. Id. at 418-19.
65 GROSSBERG, supra note 10, at 290.
6 Id.
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is sometimes compounded as the discourse of child custody allocation has,
as one commentator has suggested, all too often painted children as
"innocent victims" of their parents' (read "mother's") licentiousness. 67
While the blamelessness of children in regards to their parents' actions is
not a matter for dispute, courts often fail to offer more contextual and
nuanced portraits of parents, especially mothers, as complex beings with a
myriad of needs who possess strengths as well as imperfections. Instead,
many women whose maternal fitness is questioned as a result of actual or
alleged illicit sexual relationships have historically and contemporarily
been labeled as "immoral" with little examination of their parenting. 68 This
may be true regardless of whether the condemned sexual behavior was
during the course of the marriage or after its termination.
This type of thinking is sometimes a result of what has been called the
"binary hypothesis"-the idea that there are no degrees of moral rightness
or wrongness only clear certainties of total right or wrong.69 This view is
widely held throughout the world and is even embraced by a number of
thinkers. 70
We see this in our every day use of words with such things as right and wrong,
good and evil, truth and lies. The result of these binaries is that one side is
always favored over the other, based on the subjective ethics of the individual
and the community that produces the particular binary.71
In addition, the end result of such binaries may be "a form of dogma
that rarely allows for alternate explanations," 72 and leads ultimately to a
world in which power arrangements, especially those that are gender-based,
are endlessly replicated.
While women have gained more social freedom in many arenas, in their
roles as mothers they have been consistently held to stringent standards.
Hence, while rules in most jurisdictions no longer make divorce or
separation as difficult as it was in the past,73 child custody norms have
often adhered to traditional views of women as mothers. Child custody
norms, and their concomitant discursive frames, especially the focus on
61 Martha L. Fineman, The Politics of Custody and Gender: Child Advocacy and the
Transformation of Custody Decision Making in the USA, in CHILD CUSTODY AND THE POLITICS OF
GENDER 27, 27 (Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuijsen eds., 1989).
68 See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy -
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 565 (1983).
69 TED LOCKHART, MORAL UNCERTAINTY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES viii (2000).
70 Id. at 79.
" Shaun Michael Jex, Killing the Binary: Deconstruction in the 21st Century, SUITE 101 (Oct. 21,
2001), http://www.suite 101 .com/article.cfm/literarytheoryexplorations/82973.
72 id.
n Fineman, supra note 67, at 27.
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moral fitness, have often served to preserve masculine prerogatives and
power. 74
III. MORAL FITNESS IN CHILD CUSTODY AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO MORAL LUCK
A. The Nature of "Moral Fitness"
Traditionally, morality referred to the goodness or badness of behavior.
Stated as such, discussions of morality in child custody have become less
prevalent (or less obvious) in policy debates.75 This is part of a broader
move away from the "polarization of moral issues." 76 While some morality
discussions have become more opaque in the context of child custody,
morality has come to implicate far more. The "moral fitness" standard is
one instance of a seemingly straightforward yet highly complex application
of the idea of morality.
Moral fitness is generally seen as a factor to consider in situations of
marital misconduct such as adultery, and in some situations of post-marital
misconduct involving sexual impropriety. 77 As a general rule, such conduct
must be shown to have a present adverse effect on the child in order for the
misconduct to be relevant. Many United States courts have concluded
that custody should not be awarded to punish one party for misconduct
directed at the other spouse or to award another party for virtue.79 Indeed,
as articulated by one court, "restrained normal sexual behavior does not
make a parent unfit."80 This principle is also seen in the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act (UMDA). 8' The UMDA provides that "[t]he court shall
74 Id. at 27-28.
7 Carol Smart, The Legal and Moral Ordering of Child Custody, 18 J.L. & SoC'Y 485, 487 (1991).
76 id.
n See Alan M. Oster, Custody Proceeding: A Study of Vague and Indefinite Standards, 5 J. FAM. L.
21, 29-32 (1965).
7 See, e.g., Hartley v. Hartley, 355 S.E.2d 869, 872 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("A parent's morality,
while a proper consideration, is 'limited in its force to what relevancy it has, either directly or
indirectly, to the welfare of the child."').
79 See, e.g., Fuchs v. Fuchs, 887 S.W.2d 414, 415 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that child "[c]ustody
decisions are not to be made as punishment of a parent"); T.B.G. v. C.A.G., 772 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Mo.
1989) (en banc) (stating that "[a]warding custody of a child to one spouse rather than the other should
not be a 'reward' or 'punishment' for conduct of other spouse"); Barnhill v. Barnhill, 826 S.W.2d
443,453 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that a custody award is not punishment); In re Marriage of
Cabalquinto, 669 P.2d 886 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (stating that child "custody and visitation rights are
not to be used to penalize or reward parents for their conduct").
8 Marilyn H. v. Roger Lee H., 455 S.E.2d 570, 574 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting David M. v. Margaret
M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 924 (W. Va. 1989)).
8 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (amended 1974). The Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act (UMDA) is a uniform law consisting of five parts. Model Marriage and Divorce Act Summary,
UNIF. LAW COMM'N,
http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Model%2Marriage%20and%20Divorce%2Act (last
visited Mar. 23, 2011).
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not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his
relationship to the child."82
However, despite the modem assertion that sexual impropriety or
affairs will not be the sole decisive factor in determining child custody
between separation parents, 83 courts have shown little sympathy for parents
involved in "notorious" affairs-affairs that significantly offend norms of
social propriety.84 This is especially true where a parent engages in such
behavior with the knowledge of their children. 85 A plurality of the cases in
this area seems to feature mothers in "flagrant" behavior. 86 Those cases
considered most aggravating are where the children find a parent, often
their mother, in bed with a "paramour".87 Such behavior is seen as a
Part I has general provisions on construction of the statute .... Part II pertains to marriage.
Part III concerns dissolution of marriage. Part IV is devoted to child custody. Part V relates
to the effective date of passage, and to repeal of any part, and is a standard and short
section.
Id. It has been enacted in several states: Arizona (ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 25-311 - 25-330, 25-401 - 25-
411 (LexisNexis 2011)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 - 14-2-113, 14-10-101 - 14-10-133
(LexisNexis 2010)), Illinois (750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/101 - 5/802 (LexisNexis 2011)), Kentucky
(KY. REv. STAT. §§ 403.010 - 403.350 (LexisNexis 2010)), Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.002 -
518.66 (West 2010)), Missouri (Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.300 - 452.416 (West 2010)), Montana (MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-1-101 - 40-1404,40-4-101 - 404-226), and Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.09.181 et seq. (LexisNexis 2011)).
82 See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (amended 1974).
83 See Stamps et al, supra note 50, at 5-6.
84 See, e.g., Burris v. Burris, 388 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (finding that even though the
mother was accused of being involved in .'open and notorious fornication,"' she was still fit to be
granted custody of her children).
8 See, e.g., infra note 88.
86 For example, in Trunik v. Trunik, 426 A.2d 274, 275 (Conn. 1979), a mother appealed from an
order of the trial court changing child custody from the mother to the ex-husband. The mother argued
that "the trial court erred because the evidence was insufficient to warrant its conclusion that a change
of custody would be in the children's best interests." Id. at 275. The Supreme Court held that where the
"father had remarried and he and his present wife were capable of caring for his children," and where
the mother, while the children were home, "frequently entertained a variety of nocturnal male visitors",
granting child custody to the father was not an abuse of discretion. Id. In another case, Murphree v.
Murphree, 579 So. 2d 634, 636 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991), custody was awarded to the father when the
evidence showed that the mother had engaged in three adulterous affairs and that the children had had
negative reactions to those affairs. A similar finding is seen in D.K.L. v. L.C.L., 764 S.W.2d 664, 665
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988), where a mother "frequented bars" and engaged in many extra-marital
relationships; custody to the father was affirmed). In Lovin v. Lovin, 787 S.W.2d 865, 866-67 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1990), sex between a mother and her "friend" occurred in the contesting parents' home at times
when their preschool child was home; there, custody denied to mother. In Krug v. Krug, 647 S.W.2d
790, 792-93 (Ky. 1983), a mother was denied custody in significant part because of her numerous
sexual affairs.
87 See, e.g., Adam v. Adam, 436 N.W.2d 266, 267 (S.D. 1989) (where the mother had an affair
during the marriage. The child knew of the relationship, and was apparently upset by it. One fact in
evidence was that the mother, daughter, and the mother's lover went on a camping trip and the mother
and her lover slept in the tent while the daughter slept in the car). Jennings v. Jennings, 490 So. 2d 10,
12 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (a mother slept with her boss in room adjoining child's); In re Marriage of
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window into a parent's character and moral fitness, and what is revealed
through such windows may frequently depend upon parental gender and
life circumstances outside of the control of the parent.
B. "Lucky in Life, Unlucky in Love?"88
As gendered beings in a patriarchal society, "women and men inherit
different pasts and consequently different social expectations" and these
expectations often shape character. 89 When this happens, character
becomes part of what some scholars have called "moral luck".90 The
problem of moral luck arises in many cases because it seems correct to
morally evaluate an agent despite the fact that an important part of that
upon which an agent is evaluated depends on factors outside of that
person's control. 91 These situations of moral luck are, however, seemingly
in direct conflict with what is often seen as an intuitive moral principle, the
principle of control,92 which posits that an agent is only morally evaluable
to the extent that the agent is in control of the factors upon which he is
evaluated. In short, moral luck has to do with factors, either good or bad,
that are beyond the control of the agent. 93
The notion of morals being subject to chance seems contrary to
longstanding ideas about the nature of morality. As one scholar writes,
while few people adhere to the idea that one's life can be immune to luck,
there remains in place a "powerfully influential idea that there is one basic
form of value, moral value, which is immune to luck and-in the crucial
term of the idea's most rigorous exponent-'unconditioned'." 94 However,
it is commonly understood that the behavior and choices made by any actor
are shaped by the circumstances with which the actor is confronted. While
we often posit that an actor's intent is paramount in assessing the rightness
or wrongness of an action or the extent to which an actor should be held
accountable, we also understand that in some cases the social or legal value
of intentions depends upon external circumstances or, as we summarily call
it, "luck". According to Nagel, this luck may have four forms, including
"constitutive luck," consisting of the "kind of person you are ... your
Pothast, 539 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (mother who slept with boyfriend in front of child
in hotel properly denied custody).
88 Mark Hoekstra & Scott Hankins, Lucky in Life, Unlucky in Love? The Effect of Random Income
Shocks on Marriage and Divorce (Univ. of Pittsburgh, Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 329, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papcrs.cfm?abstract id=1629878.
89 Claudia Card, Gender and Moral Luck, in IDENTITY, CHARACTER, AND MORALITY: ESSAYS IN
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 199, 199 (Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1990).
90 Id; see generally, e.g., Thomas Nagel, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 57 (Daniel Statman ed.,
1993); Bernard Williams, Moral Luck in MORAL LUCK 35 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993); CLAUDIA CARD,
THE UNNATURAL LoTTERY: CHARACTER AND MORAL LUCK (1996).
1 See generally Nagel, supra note 90.
92 Nagel, supra note 90, at 59-60.
9 Card, supra note 89, at 199; Nagel, supra note 90, at 58.
9 Williams, supra note 90, at 35.
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inclinations, capacities, and temperament." 95 Another form of moral luck
may be luck in circumstances, such as "the kind of problems and situations
one faces." 96 The other two types of moral luck "have to do with the causes
and effects of action: luck in how one is determined by antecedent
circumstances, and luck in the way one's actions and projects turn out." 97
All four forms of moral luck can affect assessments of women's morals and
character. The second and the third, problems and situations faced and the
outcome of situations, are especially salient in the context of child custody
allocation between mothers and fathers.
Women may face a number of problems that shape their lives and
behavior. One significant and overarching problem is the way that
patriarchy exists as an oppressive force in many women's lives. The
behavior of some women may be in direct response to this experience of
patriarchal oppression, and this may lead to special insights or even the
development of enhanced mechanisms for resistance.98 It may be argued
that making such assumptions may tend to romanticize women's
experiences of oppression; indeed, oppression may lead to a lack of
resistance altogether and could encourage self-abnegation and delusion
more readily than insight.99 As a result of patriarchy, morality and
character become flexible concepts wherein the experiences of women are
not central. Hence, structuring legal decisions about child custody on
parents' morality or character is rife with the potential for disadvantage to
women.
Another life problem to which women are especially subject is
poverty.100 The feminization of poverty is a well-documented phenomenon
that occurs nationally and internationally, and is a problem that shows no
sign of abating. 01 Poverty is often closely tied to morality. 102 Being poor
is, strictly speaking, neither immoral nor illegal. 103 All too often, however,
poverty is treated as a moral failing of individuals themselves, especially
when the poor people are persons of color. 104 As one scholar has observed,
there is a significant jurisprudence of poverty in the United States, that is, a
9s Nagel, supra note 90, at 60.
96 Id.
97 Id.
9 See Card, supra note 89, at 200.
9 Id.
10 See Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg, Revisiting the Feminization of Poverty in Cross-National
Perspective, in POOR WOMEN IN RICH COUNTRIES: THE FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY OVER THE LIFE
COURSE 3, 3-5 (Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg ed., 2010).
10' See id. Schaffner indicates that women's poverty in the United States is especially pernicious
when compared to other developed nations, as women's poverty in the United States has increased
significantly over the last few decades. Id.
102 See Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.1
1499, 1502 (1991).
103 Id. at 1515 n.68.
10 STEVEN GREGORY, BLACK CORONA: RACE AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY 105 (1998).
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body of cases wherein courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
have addressed the extent to which poverty figures substantially. 0 5 In such
cases, courts often employ a "rhetoric of difference and deviance" when
speaking of the poor.106 This includes asserting, either expressly or
impliedly, that poor people are "unwilling to work and especially likely
to . .. violate other legal and moral norms." 0 7
Besides the moral luck stemming from the problems and situations that
women face, another form of moral luck that may figure prominently in the
lives of women is Nagel's last form, "luck in the way one's actions and
projects turn out."108 The expression "all's well that ends well" seems
particularly apt here.109 In some cases, especially those where women
succeed in obtaining custody of their children, there are what J.R.R.
Tolkien termed "eucatastrophic" endings.110 Tolkien coined the term
"eucatastrophe" in his discussion of fairy stories.1 ' It refers to a "'good
catastrophe, the sudden, joyous 'turn"" at the end of a story that results in
the protagonist's well being.11 2 According to one scholar, achieving
eucatastrophe involves "recovery" and "restoration," which is a process of
"defamiliarization of the known world in order to better appreciate its
qualities."" 3 Eucatastrophe reverses the tragic meaning of catastrophe
found in Greek tales and creates, usually within the context of fantasy or
supernatural tales, an escape from death. 114 Immoral mothers who attain
redemption arguably experience that process of defamiliarization when
they leave the bounds of good motherhood. When these women are
redeemed, they escape not from literal death, but from an ignominious
social death." 5
1os Ross, supra note 102, at 1499.
106 Id. at 1500 n.2.
1' Id at 1499.
'os See Nagel, supra note 90, at 60.
' Shakespeare's All's Well that Ends Well offers a good example of moral luck as luck in outcome
given the basic story line: a woman who faces obstacles such as lowly birth uses feminine wiles to win
a man, thereby risking all, and in the end, succeeds. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ALL'S WELL THAT
ENDS WELL (Susan Snyder ed., 1993).
"o See Garbowski, supra note 20, at 176-77.
" Id. at 176. Shakespeare's All's Well that Ends Well and Measure for Measure have both been
described as examples of Tolkien's eucatastrophe, especially in how the disquieting pressure of outside
forces is ultimately and happily resolved with a new beginning for the heroines of both of those plays.
See A. D. Nuttall, Measure for Measure: The Bed-Trick, in THE CAMBRIDGE SHAKESPEARE LIBRARY:
VOLUME 11: SHAKESPEARE CRITICISM 52, 55 (Catherine M. S. Alexander ed., 2003); see also Mary
Free, All's Well That Ends Well as Noncomic Comedy, in ACTING FUNNY: COMIC THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS 40, 40-41 (Frances Teague ed., 1994).
'12 Garbowski, supra note 20, at 176.
" Id.
" VERLYN FLIEGER, SPLINTERED LIGHT: LOGOS AND LANGUAGE IN TOLKIEN'S WORLD 27-28 (The
Kent State Univ. Press 2002) (1983).
us The term social death has been attributed to ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE
SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961). It was later taken up by a
number of scholars. See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE
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IV. EUCATASTROPHE AND A CHANGE IN MORAL LUCK: BURRIS V. BURRIS
There are a number of cases that potentially illustrate the notion of
women's moral luck and a change in fortunes after sexually inappropriate
activity in the context of child custody.116 While some cases result in
"wins" for the mothers, that is, they are able to obtain custody of their
STUDY 38-41 (1982). Patterson describes two conceptions of social death in the context of slavery. Id.
at 38. One mode was intrusive social death wherein the person deemed a "slave was ritually
incorporated as the permanent enemy on the inside - the 'domestic enemy."' Id. at 39. Additionally "he
did not and could not belong because he was the product of a hostile ... culture" and was "an intruder
in the sacred space." Id. The extrusive model of social death was of the "insider who had fallen,"
typically by failing to meet communal norms of behavior. Id. at 41. Patterson notes that the destitute
were included in this latter group, as their "failure to survive on their own was taken as a sign of innate
incompetence and of divine disfavor." Id.
16 Some examples of such cases that I have considered in other work are Lipsey v. Lipsey, 450 So.
2d 1095, 1096-97 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (considering the mother's "adulterous affair" when affirming
custody to the father); Sain v. Sain, 426 So. 2d 853, 855 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) (finding that evidence of
the mother committing adultery is insufficient to grant custody to the father); Simons v. Simons, 374
A.2d 1040, 1042 (Conn. 1977) (stating that "[t]he remarriage of the noncustodial parent by itself has
been held not [enough] to justify opening the question of custody"); Trunik v. Trunik, 426 A.2d 274,
275 (Conn. 1979) (finding that where the mother "frequently entertained a variety of noctumal male
visitors," custody was properly awarded to the father); Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So. 2d 22, 23-24 (Fla.
1975) (finding that despite the fact that the mother committed adultery, custody was properly granted to
the mother); Bridges v. Bridges, 398 S.E.2d 860, 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (granting custody to father
when mother admitted to having "sexual intercourse in the presence of her two minor children"); Huey
v. Huey, 322 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (stating that "the mere fact that a divorce has been
awarded to a husband on the grounds that the wife was guilty of adultery does not prevent the trial court
from exercising its discretion and awarding custody of the children to the wife"); Burris v. Burris, 388
N.E.2d 811, 812, 814-15 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (finding that where a mother and her children have moved
in with another male, the mother may retain custody of the children); Huffman v. Huffman, 176 N.W.2d
859, 861-63 (Iowa 1970) (finding that were a mother married "the man with whom she was accused of
having committed adultery," circumstances did not change enough to grant the mother custody over the
father); Maron v. Maron, 28 N.W.2d 17, 20 (Iowa 1947) (finding that "[t]he mother's admitted
adultery . . . with the man whom she married in another state the day following her divorce" was
sufficient reason to grant the father custody); Krug v. Krug, 647 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Ky. 1983) (stating
that if a mother's "misconduct has affected, or is likely to affect, the child adversely," custody should
be granted to the father); Moore v. Moore, 479 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that
where a mother allegedly engages in prostitution and commits adultery, custody can be "take[n] ...
away from the natural parent"); Remus v. Remus, 39 N.W.2d 211, 212 (Mich. 1949) (finding that even
though the wife was "infatuated and associated with another man extensively and openly," it was proper
to award custody to the mother); Florea v. Florea, 688 S.W.2d 373, 374-75 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that while "adultery, standing alone, does not require . .. a change of custody of children from
one parent to the other," adultery in combination with frequently moving the child is sufficient to
change custody); Church v. Church, 656 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (finding that where
a mother engaged in an adulterous affair, allowing her "paramour" to spend the night, it is in the best
interests of the child to grant custody to the father); Anderson v. Anderson, 771 N.E.2d 303, 311 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2002) (finding that where "the trial court based its child custody decision . . . on the family
instability caused by [wife's] extramarital affairs," it was reasonable to award custody to the husband);
Commonwealth ex. rel. Link v. Link, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 60, 74-75 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1971) (finding that
even if the "evidence was sufficient to establish an inference of adultery," custody can be granted to the
mother if the relationship does not effect the children); Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 666-68
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that wife's adultery in combination with "neglect of the children" was
sufficient to grant custody to the husband).
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children, other cases result in "losses"." 7 Such cases form part of a larger
set of cases that consider the factors to be assessed in making an award of
child custody in cases of divorce or separation." 8 For instance, executing a
Boolean search string for locating such cases ((custody visit! /10 child!) /15
(factor consider! affect effect weigh!) /p adultery) yields hundreds of
cases.1 19 Most such cases fall in the period from 1950 to 1990, with only a
relative few falling outside of this period.
The legal issues at stake in these cases offers a view of the social,
political, and economic conditions that affected the United States legal
system during this period. The years immediately after World War II
heralded an opening of United States society, the advent of the civil rights
movement, and to some extent the achievement of the promise of that
movement.12 0 At the same time, with the return of service men from war,
many of the freedoms women had gained during the war period dissolved
as women returned to the home.121 The post-war period was, to a certain
extent, the beginning of a politically conservative retrenchment for women.
Though the women's rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s drew
inspiration from the civil rights movement and saw significant gains,
women were still very frequently ensconced in the home, hobbled by
117 "Winning" or "losing" in a legal case is sometimes not a straightforward, binary yes/no situation,
since numerous issues may be raised at various levels of the proceeding. There are also partial victories
and losses, as well as nominal victories and losses. I count as "wins" those cases where the reviewing
court made a clear statement granting women custody of their children or where the matter was
remanded to the court below for proceedings that would either grant women custody or where they had
a full opportunity to argue or re-argue for custody. I count as "losses" those cases where the reviewing
court clearly denied women custody, or where the matter was remanded to the court below for
proceedings that would remove custody from women, or where the reviewing court indicated that the
father would have a full opportunity to argue against maternal custody and cited factors opposing
maternal custody. Using these definitions of wins and losses, I found in the cases I reviewed that
mothers accused of sexual misconduct won custody only about half the time.
118 In order to find cases that highlighted allegations of sexual indiscretion in child custody matters, I
began with American Law Reports, See generally C. T. Drechsler, Award of Custody of Child to Parent
Against Whom Divorce is Decreed, 23 A.L.R. 3d 6 (1969). American Law Reports (ALR) is a
frequently used resource employed by researchers of United States law to find a variety of sources
"relating to specific legal rules, doctrines, or principles." Legal Encyclopedias - Legal Research
Guides, UNIV. OF FLA. LIBRARIES, http://guides.uflib.ufl.edu/content.php?pid-44432&sid=757091 (last
visited Mar. 15, 2011). ALR, while a type of legal encyclopedia, differs in that "ALR annotations...
delve more deeply into a specific legal principles or doctrines, while, in contrast, encyclopedia articles
aim for a broader view of the legal issue." Id. ALR has been published since 1919 and remains an
important research tool for researching United States law. Id.
"9 Boolean searching is a process by which "the user searches a database with a query that connects
words with operators, such as AND, OR, or NOT." PETER JACKSON & ISABELLE MOULINIER,
NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING FOR ONLINE APPLICATIONS: TEXT RETRIEVAL, EXTRACTION AND
CATEGORIZATION 27 (2007).
120 See John Higham, Introduction: A Historical Perspective, in CIVIL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL
WRONGS: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR 113,8-9 (John Higham ed., 1997).
121 Rosie the Riveter: Women Working During World War II, U.S. NAT'L PARK SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/pwro/collection/website/rosie.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
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longstanding gender norms. 122 Such norms were frequently displayed in
cases involving allegations of a mother's sexual misconduct in the context
of child custody allocation. 123 One case that is exemplary of the body of
cases in this area is Burris v. Burris.124
In Burris, the Appellate Court of Illinois offers several discursive
themes that frequently figure in assessments of the mother's morality:
discourses of home and homeownership, discourses concerning the
importance of the nuclear family, discourses of male health and virility that
relate to male economic dominance, and finally, the overarching discourses
of surveillance that frame all of the court's discussion.125 These discourses
shape the extent to which or whether the mother's sexual conduct is
deemed as "moral" or "immoral," and therefore figure in whether mothers
"win"126 in cases where they seek custody of their children.
In Burris, a former husband petitioned to modify a divorce decree and
obtain custody of his children based upon allegations about his former
wife's cohabitation with a man without being married to him. 127 In
assessing the case, the Appellate Court of Illinois stated that "allegedly
immoral conduct, in and of itself, without a showing of detriment to the
child, is insufficient proof of the unfitness" of a proposed custodian. 128 The
Court therefore affirmed a decree awarding custody to the wife.129
The court seems to premise much of its conclusion upon the fact that
the male co-habitant of the wife provides economic support for the wife
and children.130 For instance, the court writes: "[u]ntil immediately before
the hearing in November 1977, respondent [wife] was unemployed. She
initially attempted to support herself and the children with child support
payments from Mr. Burris. Since August of 1975, respondent and the
children have been supported primarily by Mr. Weston [the male co-
habitant]."131
It is first and foremost noteworthy that the court here, unlike many of
the courts seen in such cases, refers to the wife's new partner by name.132
1' SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT 11-12,24 (1979).
123 1 discuss several such cases at length in Lolita Buckner Inniss, "Sisters Underneath their Skins":
Theorizing Maternal Performativity in Legal Discourses of White Women's Race-Involved Child
Custody Disputes in the United States, 1941-2004 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, York
University).
124 388 N.E.2d 811 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
125 See generally Burris v. Burris, 388 N.E.2d 811 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
126 See supra note 117 for a discussion of the notion of "winning" or "losing" in child custody cases.
127 Burris, 388 N.E.2d at 812, 815.
128 Id. at 814.
1'9 Id. at 815.
3o See id. at 812.
131 Id.
132 Compare id., with Lipsey v. Lipsey, 450 So. 2d 1095, 1097 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (referring to
the wife's new partner as an "alcoholic paramour"), and Church v. Church, 656 N.Y.S.2d 416, 417
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (referring to the wife's new partner as her "paramour").
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This seems to bode well for the mother in Burris.133 Indeed, the court,
while noting that Mrs. Burris lives with Mr. Weston without the benefit of
marriage, includes in its decision testimony from Mrs. Burris about her
living arrangements: "[r]espondent [the wife, Mrs. Burris] described
Weston's home as having three bedrooms, a living room, a large kitchen, a
utility room and bath, a full basement and an attic. Apparently when she
first moved in with Weston, his home had only one bedroom; two
bedrooms were subsequently added."134
The court appears to be taken with what it considers quality living
arrangements. Continuing, the court notes that the wife and Weston "live
together as husband and wife and that they share the same bed, but. . . they
have no plans to marry." 35 The mother's non-marital cohabitation would
seem to undermine her case for retaining custody. However, shortly after
offering this language the court opens what may be construed as a
redemptive morality discourse surrounding the couple's living conditions.
The court remarks that "Weston owns the home in which they reside."136
The couple, though unmarried, resides in a home, not a house, and
moreover, Weston owns that home.137
There are clearly positive connotations in the selection of the word
"home" over the word "house.". ".Home," in contrast to "house," is a
freighted word that brings with it a number of understandings, many of
them having emotional overtones and ideologies of belonging. 138 Home
often posits stasis and permanence and the diametric opposite of movement
or migration.139 One of the "primary connotation[s] of 'home' is of the
'private' space from which the individual travels into the larger arenas of
life and to which he or she returns at the end of the day."' 40 The word also
has "wider significance as the geographic place where one belongs:
country, city, village, community."141 Additionally, "[h]ome is also the
imagined location that can be more readily fixed in a mental landscape than
in actual geography."142 Perhaps most important here, home is typically
construed as a "woman's place," her natural environment. 143
' See Burris, 388 N.E.2d at 815.
134 Id. at 812.
136 id.
137 See id
.' See ROSEMARY MARANGOLY GEORGE, THE POLITICS OF HOME: POSTCOLONIAL RELOCATIONS
AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY FICTION 1-2 (1996) (discussing the connotation of the word "home").
13 See Sara Ahmed et al., Introduction: Uprootings/Regroundings: Questions of Home and
Migration, in UPROOTINGS/REGROUNDINGS: QUESTIONS OF HOME AND MIGRATION 1, 2 (Sara Ahmed
ed., 2003).
'" MARANGOLY GEORGE, supra note 138, at 11.
141 Id.
142 id
143 ELIZABETH JANEWAY, MAN'S WORLD, WOMAN'S PLACE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL MYTHOLOGY 15
(1971). Janeway, a renowned scholar and writer on women's issues, considered how the development
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Beyond this, by noting Weston's home ownership, the court engages in
what some scholars have called a discourse of home ownership.144 Such
discourses constitute housing as a social object supported by law and
society.145 "Home ownership" becomes an ideological framework that
connotes and encompasses notions of home, family, stability, and the
"proper path" to life. 146 As one scholar suggests, home ownership
discourses in the United States have also historically been deeply class
conscious and racialized as the interests of white elites seeking to maintain
racially, socially, and economically segregated neighborhoods were
expressed via such discourses. 147 In this regard, "the terms 'homeowner'
and 'homeownership' became charged with particular meanings."l 48 These
phrases were often tied to notions of citizenship, nationalism, and the
triumph of private capital over public spending, and they relied upon white
privilege for meaning. 149
Additionally, the court in Burris notes that Mr. Weston's behavior
establishes him as a crucial part of the mother's re-established nuclear
family: "Weston is divorced and has one child who neither lives with nor
visits him. He is employed as a heavy equipment operator, is usually home
when the Burris children return from school, and frequently baby-sits with
them."150 It would seem that in indicating that Mr. Weston has no other
familial claims upon him (even though he has another child) and by
emphasizing his availability for the Burris children, the court constructs
Mr. Weston as not just "a father" but "the father" to the Burris children.
While the court offers a recitation of how the children's natural father, Mr.
Burris, has remarried, the court also remarks that his new wife has three
children and that he has a new child with that wife, meaning four children
in the father's new household. 51 These four children are part of another
family unit. Traditionally, the nuclear family is understood as a unit
consisting of a father and mother in their first marriage and the children of
that marriage.152 The nuclear family is often contrasted with the extended
family, which consists of ancestors such as grandparents or collateral
of images regarding the gathering of children to the hearth developed into the notion of that
hearthspace, home, as the woman's milieu.
44 See, e.g., Richard Ronald, Meanings of Property and Home Ownership Consumption in
Divergent Socio-Economic Conditions, in HOME OWNERSHIP: GETTING IN, GETTING FROM, GETTING
OUT. PART 11127, 131 (John Doling & Marja Elsinga eds., 2006).
145 Id. at 133.
146 Id. at 132.
147 LEEANN LANDS, THE CULTURE OF PROPERTY: RACE, CLASS, AND HOUSING LANDSCAPES IN
ATLANTA, 1880-1950 9-10 (2009).
148 Id. at 10.
'49 Id. at 10.
15o Burris v. Burris, 388 N.E.2d 811, 812 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
's' Id. at 813.
152 See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution As Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?, 102 COLUM. L.
REv. 337, 381-82 (2002).
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relations such as aunts, uncles, or cousins. 153 However, as divorce has
become more common in the last several decades, both law and society
have enlarged the understanding not only of family, but also of the nuclear
family.154 Divorced or separated parents who enter into new intimate
relationships and thereby "replace" the missing husband or wife and
otherwise engage in family living that approximates nuclear-family style
living are frequently seen as better parents.155
Perhaps most striking in Burris is the court's description of the natural
father's physical limitations and resultant economic situation.156
"Subsequent to his divorce," the court writes, "Burris became disabled and
began receiving social security benefits. He suffers form a blinding eye
disease; however, his physician indicated his vision could improve."]5 7 The
court also notes that Mr. Burris's benefits are $550.00 per month, a
reduction from the $1000 per month her earned before becoming
disabled.'5 8 It would seem that part of the court's construction of a
successful father is one who has an able body and the economic ability to
support his family.
The notion of an economic aspect to manliness is one that has prevailed
in the United States throughout much of the last century.159 Victorian
manhood in both England and the United States stressed gentlemanliness,
restraint, and reticence about financial affairs.160 However, the middle and
upper class hesitance to display wealth and/or other indicia of success
changed at the turn of the nineteenth century, especially in the United
States. 161 Modern manliness included pride in social and economic
accomplishments.162 According to one scholar, this change was the
culmination of a number of factors, among them a move from an economy
dominated by agriculture and "small-scale competitive capitalism" to one
dominated by large-scale, urbanized concerns. 163 Moreover, as racial and
gender hierarchies were challenged by freed blacks, immigrants, and
" See id. at 382-83.
'14 See id. at 371-72.
55 Dolgin, supra note 152, at 373.
156 See Burris, 388 N.E.2d at 813.
Iss Id
'5 See, e.g., Thomas Winter, Class, in AMERICAN MASCULINITIES: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA
96, 96-98 (Bret E. Carroll ed., 2003).
160 See Peter Dobkin Hall & George E. Marcus, Why Should Men Leave Great Fortunes to Their
Children? Dynasty and Inheritance in America, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 139, 153-
154 (Robert K. Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee eds., 1998). See also David Kuchta, The Making of
the Self-Made Man: Class, Clothing, and English Masculinity, 1688-1832, in THE SEX OF THINGS:
GENDER AND CONSUMPTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 54, 55, 60, 63 (Victoria de Grazia & Ellen
Furlough eds., 1996).
161 GAIL BEDERMAN, MANLINESS & CIVILIZATION: A CULTuRAL HISTORY OF GENDER AND RACE IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1880-1917 11-15 (1995).
162 Id. at 12.
163 Id
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women, the model of successful manhood increasingly became one of
virility and physical strength coupled with a conspicuous economic
prowess. 164
In Burris, the court writes that while Mr. Burris testified that the
"children were 'troubled' by their mother's living arrangement with
Weston, . . . [t]here was no evidence that any of [the children's] difficulties
had been brought about by the children's living with their mother and
Weston."l 65 Perhaps most damning for Mr. Burris was the court's assertion
that Mr. Burris had testified "'he couldn't say too much against Mr.
Weston as far as how he has provided for the children."'166 In short, the
court's recitation of this quote from the father seems to suggest that Mr.
Weston, while not married to the children's mother, has, by even the
natural father's account, acted as a parent to the children. The trial court
demurred to strongly condemn the mother's involvement, stating "'[w]hile
there is no doubt that my personal code of morality might be different from
Mrs. Burris' I don't think I can let that enter into my decision."'
1 67
The trial court follows this language, seemingly approving of Mrs.
Burris and her live-in partner, with what appears to be the death knell for
Mr. Burris's claim for custody:
"While it is certainly not of Mr. Burris' making he does have a problem, of
course with his sight. He [sic] has affected his income and at this time
apparently he is not certain whether [he] is going to be [on] permanent
disability or a temporary disability. It is something that must be taken into
consideration."1 68
The Appellate Court goes on to write that even if, as the father argued,
the mother lived with a man in "open and notorious fornication"l 69 that, in
and of itself, did not constitute unfitness. The mother was not "displaying
her relationship with Weston to the embarrassment or detriment of the
children."' 70 Additionally, "[t]here was no scandalous effect of their
behavior either on their children or the public or any affront to the marital
institution shown of record."171
These words of the court regarding the absence of a "display" capture a
significant aspect of the notion of surveillance and its importance in cases
where the mother engages in sexual misconduct. The role of surveillance,
or more broadly, the "gaze," as a form of social control has been widely
'6 Id. at 16-20.
165 Burris v. Burris, 388 N.E.2d 811, 813 (111. App. Ct. 1979).
166 Id.
167 Id.
161 Id. at 813.
161 Id. at 814.
170 id s
17 ' Burris, 388 N.E.2d at 814.
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discussed in Western law and society.172 "The concept of the gaze
describes a form of power associated with the eye and the sense of
sight." 73 The power of the gaze, as one scholar writes, is ancient: this
power is exemplified in representations of the gaze in folklore, mythology,
and popular culture.174 Related to the power of the gaze is the explicit
discussion regarding the power inherent in watching others as a form of
control, much of which dates back to Jeremy Bentham and his work The
Panopticon Writings.175 A panopticon, as Bentham envisioned it, was a
type of prison building where "the inspector can see each of the prisoners at
all times, without being seen."176
Contemporary discussions of surveillance as a form of social control
have sometimes analogized the uses of new techniques of surveillance to
Bentham's ideas.177 While a significant number of these discussions
continue to occur in a criminal justice context,178 there has also been a
wider application of the notion of panopticism.' 79 Feminist scholars have
argued that in the case of women, these newer models of the binary have
been superimposed on the old without superseding them, and even when
superseding them, replicated existing power dynamics. In the particular
instance of maternal behavior, both actual surveillance techniques and
surveillance discourses seen in cases render the maternal body is legible,
leading to a preoccupation with the visible properties of motherhood. Here
is where factors such as the mother's absence from home or the race of a
mother's "male companion" or "paramour" 80 play a decisive role. In
171 See, e.g., DANI CAVALLARO, CRITICAL AND CULTURAL THEORY: THEMATIC VARIATIONS ch. 6
(2001).
" Id. at 131.
174 Id. at 131-32. For example, there are numerous references to the power of the eye or the look to
control, to maim, even to kill. Id at 132.
"7 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic ed., 1995) (1787).
76 Silke Berit Lang, They Impact of Video Systems on Architecture 52 (2004) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Swiss Federal Institue of Technology Zurich), available at
http://graphics.ethz.ch/Downloads/Publications/Dissertations/Lan4.pdf.
77 David Wood, Foucault andPanopticism Revisited 1 SURVEILLANCE & SoC'Y 234, 235 (2003).
' For its modem application to criminology, see generally MIKE MCCAHILL, THE SURVEILLANCE
WEB: THE RISE OF VISUAL SURVEILLANCE IN AN ENGLISH CITY (2002).
"9 For a consideration of the use of panopticism in information technology, see generally Oscar H.
Gandy, Jr., The Surveillance Society: Information Technology and Bureaucratic Social Control, 39 J.
COMMUNICATION 61 (1989), reprinted in THE INFORMATION GAP: How COMPUTERS AND OTHER NEW
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AFFECT THE SOCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER 61 (Marsh Siefert et
al. eds., 1989); in economics and politics, see generally Kevin Robins & Frank Webster, Cybernetic
Capitalism: Information, Technology, Everyday Life, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INFORMATION 44
(Vincent Mosco & Janet Wasko eds., 1988); to sociology of the workplace, see SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN
THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER (1988); to power relationships,
see generally NICK DYER-WITHEFORD, CYBER-MARX: CYCLES AND CIRCUITS OF STRUGGLE IN HIGH-
TECHNOLOGY CAPITALISM (1999); MARK POSTER, THE MODE OF INFORMATION: POSTSTRUCTURALISM
AND SOCIAL CONTEXT ch. 3 (1990).
Iso I observed in many cases that courts chose these constructions to describe what would otherwise
be lovers or boyfriend, thereby either depersonalizing the relationship and rendering it static or
eroticizing the relationship and rendering it lurid. Some scholars have described such discussions as
78 [Vol. 32
WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW REPORTER
surveillance discourse, "the bodily aspects become the ultimate decisive
factor in determining who one is."Is1
The court essentially states that to the eyes of watchers-the children
and society-Mrs. Burris does no wrong. Even if, as the court states, her
husband accuses her of "open and notorious ... fornication," and even
given the voice of a lone judicial dissenter who echoes the charge of
fornication,182 this claim is diminished by the extent to which Mr. Weston
steps into the role of father, effectively usurping the role of the natural
father. By providing for the mother and her children economically, the
mother's lover re-appropriates the mother's sexual conduct to the private
space of home.
V. CONCLUSION-LOVE, LUCK, OR MONEY?
Scholars across disciplines have queried the extent to which and
whether economic resources affect decisions to marry and divorce.183
Scholars have shown that for married couples, an increase in resources can
either make married couples more stable in their relationships, or,
alternatively, can enable divorce by allowing the couple to address the
costs associated with divorce.184 In Burris, morality would seem to be
closely tied to the mother's eucatastrophe-her reinvention as a good
mother in middle-class social and economic surroundings. In Burris the
mother sought and obtained the social and legal autonomy necessary to
claim both an independent intimate life and the custody of their children.
This suggests that mothers can be constructed as powerful within the milieu
of the family and in their own personal regimes.
It may, however, be troubling to some that the phenomenon of power
arising here is partially drawn from a discursive representation of
motherhood that serves to perpetuate the construction of motherhood as
central to womanhood. The mother, though she "wins" (retains custody of
her children), ultimately submits to a construct of womanhood that
essentially renders her in thrall to her children, her new intimate partner,
voyeuristic discourses. See generally CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY, AND
PEERING IN MODERN CULTURE (2000). A voyeuristic discourse can be a sexually charged discourse of
watching or of vicariously enjoying the intimacies of others. Id. at 49. Such discourses may be used for
a number of purposes. One purpose is to demean the subjects by subjecting them to a discursive public
undressing. Id. at 49-50. Another purpose is to shock and energize readers into recoiling from the
subjects. See id. at 16 (arguing that certain voyeuristic discourses in modem society occur because of a
"need [for the observer] to feel superior to or more fortunate than [the subject]").
181 Matthijs Kouw, Lizette Pater & Edo Schreuders, No Fear or Hope But New Weapons: A
Deconstruction ofPrivacy, 1 ETHICOMP E-J. 1, 8 (2004).
182 Burris v. Burris, 388 N.E.2d 811, 816 (111. App. Ct. 1979) (Jones, J., dissenting).
183 See, e.g., Hoekstra & Hankins, supra note 88 (economic analysis of the role of an "income
shock" (lottery winnings) on marriage and divorce); see generally Marianne P. Bitler et al., The Impact
of Welfare Reform on Marriage and Divorce, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 213 (2004).
1m See generally Hoekstra & Hankins, supra note 88 (manuscript at 2).
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and her home. This may serve to reinforce an uncritical adherence to
traditional social patterns of assigning caretaker roles to women.
